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Abstract
The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the
behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical
political economic papers ﬁnd that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing
districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe
that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power.
We posit that this ﬁnding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with
opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the govern-
ment of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential
unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling
for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods
allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either.
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21 Introduction: Political motives and public funds al-
location, a short review of the literature
A growing number of developing countries have become (fully or partially) democratic
since the 1990s. The impact of these political changes on the development process is a
major issue in the economic debate. Most of the papers that analyze the links between
these political changes and economic performance in developing countries are inspired
by models designed for developed countries. This is particularly true of the geographic
allocation of public funds (Diaz-Cayeros, 2008; Miguel and Zaidi, 2003; Schady, 2000;
Moser, 2008; Case, 2001; Cole, 2009).
Usually, a democratic government gunning seeking re-election will have incentives
that target two groups of people.1 The ﬁrst kind of targeted transfer is for the incumbent
government's core support group, and is sometimes called machine politics: politicians
reward their core supporters by means of the preferential allocation of public goods (or
private transfers). Theoretically, Dixit and Londregan (1996) predict this will happen
mainly if the leading party is more eﬃcient at providing public goods to its core support
group than to opposition supporters. Most of the abovementioned papers on developing
countries point up this mechanism.2
The second kind of targeted public transfer is explained by the swing voter model. It
comes about mainly if some voters have strong preferences for one of the political parties.
In that case, public goods provision targets the median voters, who are the politically
central group and could vote for either party. A number of empirical papers have pointed
up such a mechanism (like Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Diaz-Cayeros, 2008; Cole, 2009
and Banful, 2010 respectively in Sweden, USA, India and Ghana).
Levitt and Snyder (1997) mention that MPs may step up their eﬀort to obtain govern-
ment funds when they are seeking re-election. Therefore, MPs may make more of an eﬀort
in politically central districts, so that government spending is higher in these districts.
This would generate a negative correlation between the votes for the incumbent MP at
the last election and government spending. This is therefore a version of the swing voter
model for election with constituencies (with politically central constituencies instead of
1Earlier theoretical studies (including Downs, 1957 and Bowen, 1943) have been summarized and
extended by Dixit and Londregan (1996).
2See, for instance, Levitt and Snyder Jr (1995) and Joanis (2008) for empirical evidence of public
funds targeting the government's  core support group in developed countries.
3politically central voters).
Although this literature provides relevant insights into political life in established
democracies, we believe it may well fail to describe some semi-democracies, and some
African countries in particular where the political institutions are much weaker.
This assertion is related to some recent political economic literature. North, Wallis,
and Weingast, (2009a, 2009b) assert that social orders are diﬀerent in developing countries
and developed countries. They explain that the social order of developing countries is a
limited-access order (or natural state). By contrast, an open-access social order has long
been in place in most developed countries. In a natural state order, personal relationships
among the elite form the basis for political organization and constitute the grounds for
individual interaction. A natural state is ruled by a dominant coalition; people outside
the coalition have only limited access to organizations, privileges and valuable resources
and activities, (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009b). In these circumstances, elections
typically do not provide an institutional, competitive environment. This prevents political
competition from conveying information to politicians and constraining them. Therefore,
public goods are provided personally: governments are inclined to use public goods as a
means of rewarding members of the elite coalition. This mechanism may make it pointless
to target public funds on speciﬁc groups of people for electoral purposes.
In addition, in a semi-democratic country, the dictatorial mechanisms may be relevant
for the incumbent government and its opponent(s). Indeed, dictatorship (or rebellion)
is a potentially relevant alternative for them. This is particularly true when the demo-
cratic political reforms are recent and undertaken by former dictators. The literature on
post-conﬂict political economics deﬁnes conditions whereby a peace equilibrium occurs
(Esteban and Sákovics, 2008; Hirshleifer, 2001; Azam, 2006). In particular, Azam (2006)
builds a model with reference to African countries that deﬁnes conditions for a peaceful
equilibrium in a bargaining game between dictators and their opponents. In his model,
peace is systematic when the opponent faces high opportunity costs of conﬂict or when the
opponent's military technology is too poor. When the incumbent faces high opportunity
costs of conﬂict, but the opponent does not, there may be coordination between them to
avoid conﬂict. The incumbent may (partly) commit to giving a transfer to the opponent
conditional on peace, which works if this promise is credible enough.
A common feature of the framework proposed by North and his co-authors and by the
post-conﬂict political models is that personal relationships are central to an understand-
4ing of the social and economic order in some developing countries (and/or semi-democratic
countries). In both cases, the government makes compromises with the opposition elite.
In the former case, this is due to personal relationships between elite members. In the
latter, it is due to military threat.
This paper focuses on Ghana to show that political mechanisms in developing countries
may very well be counterintuitive. We ﬁnd that, while Jerry Rawlings was President (or
at least between 1998 and 2000), the accumulation of publicly provided infrastructures
was greater in districts voting for the opposition. This was due to politically sensitive
districts - districts where national opposition leaders had been general election candidates
- and districts in the capital area. We ﬁnd this result to be in line with the natural state
social order model described by North et al. (2009a) and with the bargaining mechanisms
found by Azam (2006) in an emerging democracy.
In the late 1990s, Ghana displayed conditions conducive to such a mechanism. First,
Ghana had experienced political instability prior to 1982, so the threat of political insta-
bility was credible and bargaining between the President and his opponents was equally
credible. Second, the former dictator, Jerry Rawlings, had been President for more than
15 years at that date. This may have made it easier to coordinate to ﬁnd a peaceful
equilibrium with his opponents and with all the members of the elite. Indeed, the in-
cumbent leader's commitment to give a transfer to the opponent has more credibility if he
has already made such a transfer in the past. This also makes it less likely for the opposi-
tion to win subsequent elections, as African opposition parties rarely win elections when
the former dictator is still in charge. Lastly, regular presidential and general elections
have been held peacefully every four years since 1992. Ghana was therefore an emerging
democracy between 1998 and 2003.
To our knowledge, one other paper analyzes the political motivations of public fund
transfers in the Ghanaian case. Banful (2010) studies an intergovernmental transfer: the
District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF). The DACF is supposed to be allocated in
keeping with a national formula, which is designed to favor needs-based allocation. Banful
ﬁrst shows that central government allocated fewer funds from the DACF endowment to
districts with larger vote margins in the last presidential elections. This corresponds
to the swing voter model (actually swing districts): when there is a lot of electoral
competition in a district, the provision of public funds is high. Second, her results provide
5evidence that the DACF has been targeted at districts voting for the opposition party
(except in 2003). This result seems counterintuitive and remains unexplained.
We ﬁrst show that her latter paradoxical result is not only speciﬁc to the District As-
semblies Common Fund, but reﬂects the actual national allocation of public goods. With
our nationally representative data on public goods allocation, we observe that districts
voting for the opposition saw a particularly sharp increase in public goods availability
between 1998 and 2000. Most importantly, however, we develop an economic interpreta-
tion of this observation based on the need to curry favor with opponents in an emerging
democracy, as Ghana was in the late 1990s. Standard theories based on democratic com-
petition actually fail to explain this Ghanaian pattern. Besides, our data do not reveal
the swing districts pattern found by Banful (2010): districts with smaller vote margins
did not see a particularly large accumulation of public infrastructure in our aggregated
data.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the Ghanaian political and
macroeconomic environment. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and the empirical strat-
egy. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results and
Section 7 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 Ghanaian environment
2.1 Ghana's Political History
Ghana has been independent since 1957, frequently switching between dictatorships
and democracies from 1957 to 1992. In particular, between 1966 and 1981, Ghana has
experienced frequent political instability. The Ghanaian economy has been strongly af-
fected by this instability. The main recent political leader of Ghana is Jerry Rawlings. He
was Flight Lieutenant in 1981, when he led a coup and took power. Rawlings'government
at the time included left-wing Nkrumahists,3 but made the country's economic stability a
priority right from the beginning of the 1980s. The Economic Recovery Program included
the privatization of state-owned assets and the devaluation of the Cedi, the Ghanaian cur-
rency. Since 1984, Rawlings' government and successors post a return to stable growth.
3Nkrumah was president of Ghana between 1960 and 1966. The Party he founded (the Convention
People's Party,CPP) had positions sometimes close to socialism (although Nkrumah claimed to be non-
aligned).
6Under both international and domestic pressure, Rawlings' government ushered in
democracy with the ﬁrst parliamentary and presidential elections in 1992.4 Rawlings
stood for his own succession as candidate for the National Democratic Congress (NDC).
One candidate represented the Danquah/Busia movement5 (right wing), on behalf of the
New Patriotic Party (NPP). Three candidates represented the Nkrumahist movement
and the most credible of them struck an electoral alliance with the NPP. The splinter-
ing of the Nkrumahist movement and its paradoxical alliance with the right-wing party
left the door wide open for Rawlings to move into their traditional political arena: like
Kwame Nkrumah, Rawlings was a charismatic leader and presented a populist platform
ideologically close to the Nkrumah tradition (see Morrison, 2004).
Today, the NDC is considered to be the left-wing party in Ghana, and is a member
of Socialist International, whereas the Nkrumahists are now minor parties. The NPP
is deemed the right-wing party. However, the political parties are also diﬀerentiated on
an ethnic basis. The NPP is largely supported by the Ashanti and has its geographic
strongholds in the Ashanti region. Conversely, the Volta region is inhabited by Ewe,
Rawlings' ethnic group, and votes for the NDC. The poorest Northern regions also tend
to vote for the NDC (see Bossuroy, 2008). These geographic patterns have been constant
since 1992 (see Figure 1).
Since this time, presidential and parliamentary elections have been held every four
years. In 1996, with Ghana's political system leaning towards a two-party system, the
two main parties secured most of the votes, and the NDC won both the presidential (Jerry
Rawlings) and parliamentary elections.
The 2000 elections were very diﬀerent from the previous ones. First, Jerry Rawlings
was constitutionally prevented from running for a third presidential term. He is one
of the rare African presidents to have fulﬁlled this obligation. So the NDC candidate
was John Atta Mills, who was seen as less charismatic and was less well-known at the
time. In addition, the NDC's campaign was perceived by some as arrogant and the
economic situation had taken a downturn (Boafo-Arthur, 2008). The elections were won
by John Kufuor for the NPP, which also won the parliamentary elections. However,
voting patterns revealed a geographically heterogeneous shift. In 1996, broadly 80% of
4However, the ﬁrst parliamentary elections were not representative since they were boycotted by the
opposition.
5Joseph B. Danquah led the ﬁrst Ghanaian political party in the days before independence, the United
Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). Koﬁ Busia was one of the founders of the National Liberation Movement
(NLM) party, a conservative party supported by the Ashanti region and the educated elite.
7Figure 1: Presidential elections, % of votes for the NPP party in 1996, 2002 and 2000
1996 2000 2004
Sources: Oﬃcial election results, authors' calculations
the Central, Brong-Ahafo and Northern MPs were members of the NDC. In 2000, the
NDC won 80% of the seats in the Northern region, 50% in the Central region, and 33%
in the Brong-Ahafo, where the shift was impressive (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
Overall, the NPP essentially won the support of Accra and the Akan regions (Ashanti,
Eastern, Brong-Ahafo and, to a lesser extent, Central regions).6
In 2004, the NPP (led by Kufuor) won the presidential and parliamentary elections, but
this dominance remained fragile and the party had lost part of its inﬂuence in Accra. The
second democratic shift in Ghanaian history took place in 2008. John Atta Mills (NDC)
won the presidential elections with 50.23% in the second round, and the NDC took 114 of
the 228 seats (107 for the NPP). Nana Akufo-Addo was the NPP's presidential candidate.
2.2 Public service policies in Ghana
A centralized system behind decentralization reforms
Decentralization reforms have been implemented in Ghana since the 80's. However,
the central government remains the main political decision-maker.
6Asante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004) talk of anti-Ashanti sentiments in some regions (Ashanti is the
largest ethnic group among the Akan and is associated with the NPP). This could explain why softening
the NPP's ethnic identity could be proﬁtable for this party in non-Ashanti Akan regions.
8The major decentralization program was launched in 1988. It was designed mainly to
devolve some political and central government power7 to the district assemblies. However,
most observers of the decentralization process believe that many factors impeded local
government capacities, autonomy and performance (Asante, 2003; Asante and Ayee, 2008;
Akramov and Asante, 2008). Lack of funds is one of the reasons for their weak decision-
making power: transfers from central government account for over 80% of local revenues
and around 2.5% of central government public expenditure.8 The will to maintain as
strong a central government as possible has actually driven policy and reforms in Ghana
since independence. For instance, a federalist system has always been rejected, and it is
well known that one of the aims of the decentralization reforms - ﬁrst implemented by
Rawlings - was to curb the chieftaincies' power (Jacquemot, 2007).
Investments in local infrastructures
Ghana's growth performances over the past two decades have been positive and stable
with real GDP per capita growth rates standing at around 2% per year. As shown by
Figure 2, per capita public expenditure rose steadily during this period of stability and
growth, even though public capital expenditure growth was erratic. Note that most of
public capital expenditure is ﬁnanced by Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA), which
funds the majority of the reforms and investment in the social sectors. Figure 3 presents
the national mean levels for the public facilities analyzed in this paper. The indicators on
primary and secondary school and healthcare facilities are presented for the rural areas
only, since our data do not provide statistics on school and health centre facilities in towns
(see the Data section below and Appendix A for more detailed information on the data).
Mean access to primary and secondary schools, even in rural areas, appears to be
quite high. Around 90% of rural inhabitants live in areas with at least one primary
school. 66% of primary schools were built when Kwame Nkrumah was president(1957-
1966) (Akyeampong, Diangmah, Oduro, Seidu, and Hunt, 2007). The main progress
since the mid-1980s appears to be in electricity and water supply. The number of people
connected to the electricity grid doubled while access to piped water was multiplied by
7Including decentralized administration, development planning and implementation.
8These funds (District Assembly Common Funds, DACF) are allocated among the districts based on a
formula approved by the National Parliament every year. Akramov and Asante (2008) and Banful (2010)
report that this formula takes in various social and economic factors such as Need, Responsiveness,
Service Pressure, and Equality.
9Figure 2: GDP at constant prices and public expenditure per capita (Cedis), 1987 - 2004
Sources: IMF 2000, 2005; WDI 2006.
Note: Central government public expenditure data are not available for 1999.
10
Figure 3: Public goods provision (% of people with access to public facilities), 1988- 2003
Source: see Data section below.
Note: Access to primary and secondary schools and health centres is measured as a percentage of people
living in rural areas with primary and secondary schools and health centres. The electricity and piped
water indicators present the percentage of people living in dwellings connected to the electricity grid and
with access to piped water. The civil servant statistic covers the people working in the public sector as
a percentage of the labor force as a whole.
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2.5. Employment in the public sector fell from 2000 onwards.9
Regional disparities in public goods in Ghana
These national infrastructure levels conceal large regional disparities (Figure 4). The
most obvious regional inequality is between the North and South of the country. This
is quite closely correlated with poverty (Figure 5). Yet, over and above the country's
North-South divide, there are disparities between districts. The disparities in the North
are especially salient between rural and urban areas. In the South, some districts of the
Brong Ahafo, Western and even Ashanti regions are less endowed with public goods than
the average of Upper West, Upper East and Northern regions (Figure 4).
3 Data
This paper draws on election data and national household data. The election results
for the 1996, 2000 and 2004 presidential elections are aggregated at district level.10
The information on public goods and covariates is drawn from a number of national
household datasets, namely GLSS4 (1998), DHS (1998 and 2003), the 2000 national house-
hold and facility survey, and the 2003 CWIQ survey.11 Together, these surveys provide
information on the availability of public goods in Ghanaian districts at three points in
time: 1998, 2000 and 2003. Figure 6 presents an overview of the national survey we use
and compares their dates with the dates of national elections. They include information
on the share of households with access to electricity and piped water12 (all surveys), the
share of civil servants (all except the DHS surveys), and the share of the rural population
with access to primary schools, secondary schools and community clinics13 (all surveys
except the DHS). All this information is aggregated at district level to generate district
access rates for each facility. Appendix A presents the deﬁnition of each variable in detail
and the sample size for the surveys used.
9Yet these comparisons using diﬀerent surveys are not necessarily entirely reliable, as they depend on
the comparability of the surveys in question.
10The parliamentary and presidential elections are held at the same time in Ghana. Since both re-
sults are highly correlated, we focus on the presidential election outcomes in this paper. Parliamentary
constituencies are nested in the 2000 districts.
11Section 2 draws on the GLSS1 and DHS 93 surveys for its national statistics for 1988 and 1993.
12Inside or outside the household dwelling.
13Note, however, that this information is based on the availability of the public good in the community
in the GLSS and the facility survey, while it is based on travelling time between the household and the
facility in the CWIQ survey.
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Figure 4: Normalized public goods ag-
gregate, 2000
Figure 5: Mean housing amenities index,
2000
Source: Population and Infrastructure Census, 2000, authors' calculations.
Note: The map on the left shows the normalized public goods aggregate. Public goods are primary
and secondary schools and health centers in rural areas, and civil servants, electricity and piped water
connections for the country as a whole. The map on the right presents the mean score for housing
amenities by district. The score is the sum of the indicators for the fuel used and housing roof, wall
and ﬂoor building materials. The higher the score, the better the housing amenities (see Section ?? and
Appendix A).
Figure 6: National elections and national household surveys in Ghana between 1996 and
2004
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The same national household datasets include socioeconomic information such as ed-
ucation, the quality of the household's dwelling (all except the DHS surveys), and ethnic
and religious structure. All this information is aggregated at district level.
Finally, we have two variables to single out districts with inﬂuent members of the
elite. We have drawn a list of Ghanaian former ministers at the end of the 1990s and the
beginning of the 2000s.14 We took the names of each minister in Kufuor's government
from 2001 to 2005 and the names of each minister in Rawlings' government from 1993
to 2000. The 1996 parliamentary election results provide information on whether they
were candidates and, if so, in which district. Of the 37 Kufuor's ministers, 15 were
NPP candidates in the 1996 parliamentary election and 14 were elected. Eight of the
corresponding 15 districts were urban (proportion of urban population greater than 50%)
and six of these were regional capitals. We also single out the districts where the 1996
parliamentary election candidate was a minister before 2000, under NDC rule. Of the
39 Rawlings' ministers, 18 were NDC candidates and 17 were elected. Only ﬁve of the
corresponding 17 districts were urban and two of these regional capitals (Accra and New
Juaben).
As the information in this paper is aggregated at the district level, it is worth noting
we focus on the Ghanaian districts as of 2000, and there were 110 districts in 2000.
4 Estimation strategy
4.1 Baseline model
This paper seeks to identify the link between political mechanisms and public goods
allocation in Ghana. As pointed out in the introduction, a number of theoretical mod-
els can ﬁnd a link between districts' electoral results and this allocation. Firstly, the
party machine model predicts that the districts voting for the incumbent will receive
more public goods. Secondly, the swing voter model predicts that the politically centre
districts will be favored. Lastly, the post-conﬂict literature and the limited-access order
model of North et al. (2009b) posit that the government may very well curry favor with
its opponents and may therefore invest in their districts.
To assess the relative relevance of these models in the Ghanaian case, we estimate
equation (1) over two periods: 1998 - 2000 (period 1) and 2000 - 2003 (period 2).
14This list is from Wikipedia and may not be complete.
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Gg,d,t,s = ρGg,d,t−1,s + αδ(t)diffd,t−1 + γdiff 2d,t−1 +Xd,t−1β + g,d,t,s + µs(Gg,d,t) (1)
Gg,d,t,s is the availability of public good g in district d at the end of the period, as found
by survey s. Gg,d,t−1,s is the availability of public good g in district d at the beginning of
the period, as found by survey s. In keeping with the survey dates, for period 1, t is 2000
and t− 1 is 1998; for period 2, t is 2003 and t− 1 is 2000.
diffd,t−1 is the diﬀerence between the share of votes for the NPP and the NDC in
district d at the last presidential elections15: at the 1996 election for period 1 (1998-2000)
and at the 2000 election for period 2 (2000-2003). diffd,t−1 takes positive values when
the NPP is the majority party in the district and negative values when the NDC is the
majority party.
δ(t) is a time dummy variable that takes value 1 if the NDC is in power at time t
(period 1) and 0 if the NPP rules at time t (period 2). Coeﬃcient α captures whether
or not the government in power provides its supporters' districts with more public goods.
In actual fact, α measures the double diﬀerence between NPP voters and NDC voters,
and between period 1 (1998-2000) and period 2 (2000-2003).16 It is the main coeﬃcient
in this paper, as it points up the pork barrel mechanisms. α should be negative under the
party machine model: the NDC was in charge during period 1, the NPP was in charge
during period 2, so the NPP voters should be relatively deprived during period 1. α can
be positive only under the post-conﬂict literature model and the natural order model,
where the incumbent helps its opponents.
The empirical validity of our strategy is based on the double diﬀerence between dis-
tricts voting for the NPP and for the NDC, and between period 1 and period 2. Therefore,
we need to ﬁnd the districts' unobservable characteristics that cause the accumulation of
public goods to be constant over the ﬁve years of our panel. In particular, the corre-
lation between the districts' political preferences and the accumulation of public goods
changes between the periods 1 and 2. This should be exclusively ascribed to a pork barrel
mechanism.
Coeﬃcient γ in model (1) is the coeﬃcient of the square of the diﬀerence between the
15We use solely the results of the presidential elections in this paper. However, the patterns are the
same when we look at the results of the parliamentary elections.
16The covariates Xd,t−1 include time dummies and diffd,t−1. The complete list is given below.
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NPP and the NDC. It is expected to be negative under the swing voter model: political
competition may increase investment in public goods.
A vector of covariates Xd,t−1 is added, including diffd,t−1, proxies for the district's
wealth and education, ethnic structure, and region-year dummies (there are 10 regions in
Ghana, the 110 districts are nested in the regions). The covariates are measured at the
beginning of the period, since investment over the period may aﬀect the covariates at the
end of the period. The estimations are made by pooling all the types of public goods by
year and survey. All the speciﬁcations consequently contain type of public good-survey
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Some public goods are measured on the same date by two diﬀerent surveys. For
example, the share of households connected to the electricity grid and to piped water
in 2003 is measured by the 2003 DHS survey and by the CWIQ survey (Figure 6). In
our data, all this information is pooled, as two observations of the same good in the
same district from two surveys are far from independent. We therefore have to control
in detail for the correlation between those two observations. So error term µs(Gg,d,t) is
included in the equation. All the standard errors are then corrected for an arbitrary
correlation between diﬀerent observations for the same district. The variance-covariance
matrix between diﬀerent observations for the same district is given by the data. The
estimated standard errors are hence corrected for the fact that two observations of the
same good in the same district from two surveys are strongly correlated.
The model (1) pools diﬀerent types of public goods (schools, health centers, etc.).
Hence, the information on each public good is normalized: the observations for diﬀerent
districts in the same survey for the same good g have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of 1. We interpret our normalized variable Gg,d,t,s as the relative position in the country
of district d for public good g at time t. The relative position is comparable across goods
and dates.
4.2 Interacted model
The post-conﬂict literature model and the natural order model do not predict
the government will target any opponent district. Conversely, however, the post-conﬂict
literature model predicts that the government will target opponents with enough political
power to lead a coup (bribing them in peace time increases the opportunity cost of a
coup). The natural order model predicts the government will target the elite among its
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opponents. Both may obviously be correlated. Let's assume we can measure political
power pp, then this heterogeneity is measured in model (2) by coeﬃcient κ > 0:
Gg,d,t,s = ρGg,d,t−1 + αδ(t)diffd,t−1 + κδ(t)diffd,t−1pp
+γdiff 2d,t−1 +Xd,t−1β1 + β2pp+ g,d,t,s + µs(Gg,d,t)
(2)
4.3 Fixed-eﬀect model
The coeﬃcient ρ of Gg,d,t−1 is expected to be positive. Note, however, that in this
equation, the residuals g,d,t,s may well be serially correlated. A serial correlation of these
residuals would induce a correlation between Gg,d,t,s and Gg,d,t−1,s due to the correlation
between g,d,t,s and g,d,t−1. This would mean that ρ would then be biased. It should be
positive for two reasons: because there is some inertia in public goods availability, and
because the unobservable characteristics causing Gg,d,t,s are persistent. ρ would be the
sum of these two eﬀects. This has a repercussion for the other coeﬃcients: the control for
Gg,d,t−1,s is imperfect. To see the extent to which the empirical results of model (1) and
model (2) may be biased, we estimate a ﬁxed-eﬀect speciﬁcation for model (1) and model
(2), which controls for the constant district unobservable characteristics in equation (3)
and (4). (Note that diffd,1996 is taken from the 1996 elections for periods 1 and 2 to
ensure strict exogeneity in this speciﬁcation.)
Gg,d,t,s = αδ(t)diffd,1996 + λd + g,d,t,s + µs(Gg,d,t) (3)
Gg,d,t,s = αδ(t)diffd,1996 + κδ(t)diffd,1996pp
+λd + g,d,t,s + µs(Gg,d,t)
(4)
4.4 Fully interacted model
Lastly, the political power of a district pp may be correlated with observable character-
istics Xd,t−1 or with unobservable characteristics g,d,t,s. This can make the identiﬁcation
of equation (2) questionable. If coeﬃcient α is heterogeneous between districts with dif-
ferent (Xd,t−1, g,d,t,s) and pp is correlated with (Xd,t−1, g,d,t,s), then the estimation of κ
in equation (2) is biased. The estimation of equation (5) controls for the interaction
δ(t)diffd,t−1Xd,t−1, assuming α = α0 + β3Xd,t−1. Therefore, it assesses whether the esti-
mation of κ in equation (2) may be subject to an omitted variable bias, if the omitted
variable is included in Xd,t−1 or correlated with Xd,t−1.
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Gg,d,t,s = ρGg,d,t−1 + α0δ(t)diffd,t−1 + κδ(t)diffd,t−1pp
+γdiff 2d,t−1 +Xd,t−1β1 + β2pp
+β3δ(t)diffd,t−1Xd,t−1 + g,d,t,s + µs(Gg,d,t)
(5)
5 Results
Table 1 shows the results of the estimation of three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of model
(1). The ﬁrst speciﬁcation does not include any control for the districts' characteristics,
whereas speciﬁcations 2 and 3 take in diﬀerent vectors of covariates. The last two speci-
ﬁcations are the estimations of model (2). Region-year dummies and survey-public good
dummies are included in all speciﬁcations, but their coeﬃcients are not shown. The esti-
mated standard errors are robust to the correlation of diﬀerent observations of the same
district. Table 2 shows the district ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation.
In each speciﬁcation, the public good index at time t − 1 is a predictor of the public
good index at time t. The coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant, as expected.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (column 1, Table 1), the diﬀerence between votes for the NPP
and the NDC is correlated with the increase in infrastructure availability. However, the
coeﬃcient becomes much smaller and not signiﬁcant when controlling for the covariates,
especially the district's mean wealth level (column 2 and following). The fact that the
coeﬃcient of the diﬀerence in votes between the NPP and the NDC is halved when
controlling for urbanization and education can be explained by the fact that the NPP
is the right-wing party in Ghana. The districts that vote for the NPP are wealthier on
average, and wealthier districts accumulate more public goods. The correlation between
votes and infrastructure availability diminishes when controlling for our proxies for wealth,
education and urbanization.
The coeﬃcient of the diﬀerences in votes interacted with the dummy for the ﬁrst
period (fourth line of Table 1) is positive and signiﬁcant in each speciﬁcation (columns 1,
2 and 3). It is the estimation of coeﬃcient α in equation (1): the double diﬀerence between
NPP voters and NDC voters, between period 1 and period 2. The ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation
renders the same positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (Column 1 in Table 2). This positive
coeﬃcient means that the NPP voters were relatively favored in period 1, when the NDC
was in charge. The standard democratic competition theories are therefore useless when it
comes to explaining this pattern in the relation between votes and public investment. The
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machine politics model does not ﬁt the data, since the districts supporting the parties
in power did not receive more public goods and the districts supporting the opposition
actually received more public goods between 1998 and 2000. In addition, the swing
voter model produces no prediction for coeﬃcient α, but does provide a prediction for
coeﬃcient γ. It is therefore unable to explain why α is positive.
This paper gives a plausible explanation for this fact, based on the estimation of model
(2). Speciﬁcations 4, 5, Table 1 and speciﬁcation 2, Table 2 interpret the counterintuitive
relationship between votes and the allocation of public goods, by estimating coeﬃcient
κ in equation (2) in column 4 and column 5, Table 1. Column 2, Table 2 shows the
corresponding district ﬁxed-eﬀect speciﬁcation (equation (4)). These speciﬁcations focus
on the relationship between votes and public goods allocation in diﬀerent contexts. They
single out districts with diﬀerent kinds of political power, as found by equation (2).
First, we single out districts in which a candidate standing for the 1996 parliamentary
elections became minister after 2000 (under NPP rule). These districts were probably
the constituency of a leader of the opposition party before 2000. In these 15 districts,
the coeﬃcient of the correlation between voting for the NPP and public goods in the ﬁrst
period is positive and signiﬁcant (2.71, line 6, column 4 Table 1). By comparison, it is not
signiﬁcant in the other districts (0.30, line 4, column 4 Table 1). Our interpretation of this
result is as follows: in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the NDC government
wants to govern a peaceful country. Therefore, sensitive districts are rewarded to ensure
the country's stability. The districts with an opposition leader may be considered to be
sensitive mainly when they are opposition strongholds. This would explain the positive
coeﬃcient of the interaction between our proxy for politicians and votes under the NDC
government.
We also single out the districts where the 1996 parliamentary election candidate was
a minister before 2000, under NDC rule. The coeﬃcient of this dummy variable and its
interaction with votes is not signiﬁcant, from 1998 to 2000 (line 8, column 4 Table 1).
The districts with an NDC leader did not receive more public goods than others during
Rawlings' government, whatever their election results. Again, this is not in line with the
party machine model. However, column 4, Table 1, shows that after 2000, the districts
with an opposition (NDC) leader had more public goods. The coeﬃcient of the interaction
between votes and the dummy variable for districts with an NDC minister is signiﬁcant
and positive (0.46, line 7).
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Table 1: Determinants of the allocation of public goods in Ghana
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lag of public good index 0.49** 0.35** 0.36** 0.35** 0.35**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Votes NPP - Votes NDC 0.56** 0.22 0.29 0.36+ 0.34+
(0.14) (0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC)2 0.50* 0.38+ 0.42+ 0.34+ 0.34+
(0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * (1998 - 2000) 0.79** 0.71** 0.62+ 0.30 0.38
(0.25) (0.24) (0.34) (0.28) (0.30)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) -1.16**
* NPP parliamentary candidate, minister after 2000 (0.24)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * (1998 - 2000) 2.71**
* NPP parliamentary candidate, minister after 2000 (0.60)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) 0.46**
* NDC parliamentary candidate, minister before 2000 (0.14)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * (1998 - 2000) -0.63
* NDC parliamentary candidate, minister before 2000 (0.40)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * political index -0.56**
(0.13)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * (1998 - 2000) * political index 0.94*
(0.38)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) -1.35** -1.36**
* District in Accra region (0.20) (0.21)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * (1998 - 2000) 2.61** 2.36**
* District in Accra region (0.43) (0.40)
Share of urban population in the district 0.37* 0.36+ 0.25 0.30+
(measured in 2000) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Education index in the district 0.33** 0.31** 0.34** 0.33**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Household amenities index 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Ethnic heterogeneity index -0.69 -0.60 -0.63 -0.60
(0.69) (0.68) (0.71) (0.70)
Share of Akan in the district -0.30+ -0.46+ -0.47* -0.46+
(0.16) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24)
Share of Akan in the district * (2000 - 2003) 0.33 0.28 0.26
(0.34) (0.31) (0.31)
Share of Ewe in the district 0.03 -0.12 0.11 0.13
(0.20) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26)
Share of Ewe in the district * (2000 - 2003) 0.30 -0.06 -0.05
(0.39) (0.39) (0.38)
Share of Ashanti in the district (measured in 2000) -0.52+ -0.61 -0.60+ -0.59+
(0.29) (0.39) (0.34) (0.34)
Share of Ashanti in the district (in 2000) * (2000 - 2003) 0.19 0.28 0.23
(0.60) (0.53) (0.57)
log(population density) (measured in 2000) 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.15**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
NPP Parliamentary candidate, minister after 2000 0.37** 0.18*
(0.08) (0.08)
NPP Parliamentary candidate, minister after 2000 -0.37+ -0.00
* (1998 - 2000) (0.19) (0.17)
NDC Parliamentary candidate, minister before 2000 0.12 0.13+
(0.07) (0.07)
NDC Parliamentary candidate, minister before 2000 -0.28 -0.38*
* (1998 - 2000) (0.19) (0.18)
Observations 1480 1449 1449 1449 1449
R2 0.515 0.570 0.571 0.585 0.582
**, * and + mean respectively that the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Notes: OLS with standard errors given beneath the coeﬃcients. The standard errors are corrected for an arbitrary correlation
between diﬀerent observations for the same district. The public goods included in the speciﬁcation are: the share of
households connected to the electricity grid, the share of households with access to piped water, the share of civil servants
in the labor force, the share of the rural population with access to a primary school in the community, the share of the
rural population with access to a secondary school in the community, and the share of the rural population with access to a
health clinic in the community. All the speciﬁcations include region-year ﬁxed eﬀects and type of public good-survey ﬁxed
eﬀects.
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Table 2: Determinants of the allocation of public goods in Ghana, ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁca-
tions
(1) (2)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) (1996 elections) * (1998 - 2000) 0.28+ 0.09
(0.16) (0.15)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) (1996 elections) * (1998 - 2000) 0.58*
* political index (0.27)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) (1996 elections) * (1998 - 2000) 1.79**
* District in Accra region (0.36)
NPP parliamentary candidate, minister after 2000 * (1998 - 2000) 0.09
(0.14)




**, * and + mean respectively that the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Notes: OLS with standard errors given beneath the coeﬃcients. The standard errors are corrected for
an arbitrary correlation between diﬀerent observations for the same district. The public goods included
in the speciﬁcation are: the share of households connected to the electricity grid, the share of households
with access to piped water, the share of civil servants in the labor force, the share of the rural population
with access to a primary school in the community, the share of the rural population with access to a
secondary school in the community, and the share of the rural population with access to a health clinic
in the community. All the speciﬁcations include region-year ﬁxed eﬀects and type of public good-survey
ﬁxed eﬀects.
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We then generate a political index that takes the value of 1 if one of the parliamentary
election candidates was a minister under NPP rule and -1 if one of the parliamentary
election candidates was a minister under NDC rule.17 As expected, the coeﬃcient for the
interactions between votes and this index is positive and signiﬁcant from 1998 to 2000 in
column 5, Table 1, and negative and signiﬁcant from 2000 to 2003 in column 5. The same
result is found with the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation (column 2 in Table 2).
The correlation between support for the NPP and the diﬀerences in votes is also
positive in the Accra region in the ﬁrst period. This is also compatible with our theory
of sensitive districts, as the capital's regions are well known for being a good place for
demonstrations and they take in many members of the elite.
Column 4, Table 1 also presents a negative coeﬃcient for votes in the Accra region
under NPP rule. This means that the districts voting for the NPP in Accra received fewer
public goods after 2000. This coeﬃcient is intuitive: Accra is a sensitive place for both
parties.
Overall, the validity of model (2) (κ > 0) means that the government curries favor
with its opponents' elite. This does not mean it does not help its own supporters' elite. In
fact, we only observe transfers through public goods allocation in the districts. Transfers
to the supporters' elite may go via a diﬀerent channel, and some of the potential channels
cannot be observed by the social scientist (such as informal cash transfers).
In line three of Table 1, the coeﬃcients for the square of the diﬀerence between NPP
and NDC votes are always positive and signiﬁcant. This coeﬃcient appears to invalidate
the swing voter model, or at least the version put forward by Levitt and Snyder (1997),
wherein politically centre districts receive more public funds because of MPs' incentives.
The politically centre districts in the electoral competition do not beneﬁt from particularly
generous investment in public goods.
The coeﬃcients of the log of population density and mean education in the district
are positive in columns 2 and 3. The coeﬃcient for wealth (as measured by our household
amenities index) is not signiﬁcant, but wealth is strongly correlated with urbanization
and education. This means that urban districts receive more public goods, which may
be due to cost-recovery policies and community-driven approaches or national political
targeting. The coeﬃcients for the other covariates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at the 5% level. For instance, the coeﬃcient for the ethnic heterogeneity variable is not
17This political index takes the value of 0 if none of the parliamentary election candidates was a minister
and if at least one parliamentary election candidate was a minister for either party.
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signiﬁcant. This result diﬀers from the ﬁndings of Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) in
India, where ethnic heterogeneity prevents an increase in public goods availability from
1971 to 1991. This result may be partly explained by the fact that Ghana's system of
public goods allocation is centralized, rather than decentralized.
The Akan districts, and especially the Ashanti districts, receive fewer public goods
than the others, but these results are signiﬁcant only at the 10% level. This is true only
after controlling for the other covariates. The same regressions without controlling for
votes would paint a totally diﬀerent picture of ethnicity, as votes are strongly correlated
with ethnicity in Ghana. Once ethnic pork barreling has been disentangled from electoral
pork barreling, the eﬀect of ethnic pork barreling is small and rarely signiﬁcant.
6 Robustness checks
This section assesses the validity of the interpretation of the coeﬃcients in Table 1.
It focuses on the link between the allocation of public goods and votes. Section 5 shows
that investment in infrastructures under NDC rule was particularly high in the sensitive
districts18 that voted for the NPP. The OLS estimates could be biased by two diﬀerent
mechanisms: reverse causality and omitted variables. Reverse causality does not seem
plausible in this case. The allocation of public goods from 1998 to 2000 causes neither
the votes in 1996 nor the fact that a given district is in the Accra region. Moreover,
it seems implausible for the ministers in the NPP government after 2000 to have been
chosen because they obtained public goods from the NDC before 2000.
As regards the omitted variables bias, we identify the coeﬃcient κ with the heterogene-
ity of the correlation between the votes for the NPP and public goods between districts
with and without political power. However, political power is probably correlated with
other characteristics Xit. In equation (5), we assume these characteristics Xit may be cor-
related with the heterogeneity of coeﬃcient α. Table 3 assesses whether such heterogeneity
biases the coeﬃcients in Table 1. In other words, the correlation between votes for the
NPP and public goods is bigger in the districts with political power. We check whether
some heterogeneity of the correlation between votes for the NPP and public goods based
on other observable characteristics can change our results.
To do so, the diﬀerence in votes is interacted with a number of other characteris-
18In other words, districts with a national NPP politician or in the Accra region.
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tics (plus an interaction with the dummy for the 1998-2000 period), as in equation (5).
The variables included are: the district's population density, share of urban population,
education index, household amenities index and ethnic variables. Column 2 of Table 3
presents the results of this speciﬁcation, and the ﬁrst column of this table reproduces the
estimates from Table 1, speciﬁcation 5. In columns 1 and 2, the sign and signiﬁcance of
the coeﬃcients interacted with the diﬀerence in votes are the same, which indicates that
the omitted variable bias is probably moderate.
The coeﬃcient for the interaction between the diﬀerence in votes and the log of popula-
tion density and the diﬀerence in votes for the 1998-2000 period is positive and signiﬁcant
(0.54). Again, this is compatible with our theory of a targeting of "sensitive districts", as
urban districts may be harder to control.
The coeﬃcient for the interaction between the diﬀerence in votes and the share of
Akan for period 1 (1998-2000) is positive and signiﬁcant (2.24). Again, Akan might be
a proxy for strong opposition to the ruling party before 2000. Indeed, it is the majority
ethnic group in Ghana, and Akans tend to vote for the NPP, which was the opposition
party prior to 2000. The other coeﬃcients interacted with the diﬀerence in votes for the
1998-2000 period in column 2 are not signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and do not change the
column 1 coeﬃcients.
Column 3 tests for an omitted variable bias due to other political considerations.
Asante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004) explain that Rawlings' government made an eﬀort in
the Ashanti region. Two explanations are possible. The ﬁrst is the will to win votes
from the Ewe, who migrated to the region to produce cocoa. The second ties in with
the traditional Ashanti kingdoms, which may still wield power and compel certain public
transfers from central government. So we control for a speciﬁc eﬀect of the share of Ewe
in the Ashanti region. One of the two variables for this eﬀect appears to be signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. In addition, we control for the same particularity tying in with the Ashanti
kingdoms. These kingdoms are in the Ashanti region, and the best proxy we have for the
districts within these kingdoms is the share of the Ashanti ethnic group in the population.
So we control for a speciﬁc eﬀect of the Ashanti ethnic group in the Ashanti region, which
does not appear to be signiﬁcant. Overall, the coeﬃcients of interest in column 3 are very
similar to those in column 1.
Table 4 presents speciﬁcation 5 for Table 1 disaggregated by type of public good. The
estimation of the coeﬃcients is imprecise here, as the sample has been broken down into
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Table 3: Endogeneity checks: control for omitted variables
(1) (2) (3)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * (1998 - 2000) 0.38 -3.14 -0.30
(0.30) (2.34) (0.23)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) 0.34+ 3.44+ 0.28
(0.20) (1.95) (0.17)
Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * political index -0.56** -0.42** -0.49**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * (1998 - 2000) * political index 0.94* 0.88** 0.83*
(0.38) (0.29) (0.34)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * District in Accra region -1.36** -1.60** -1.09**
(0.21) (0.38) (0.23)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * District in Accra region * (1998 - 2000) 2.36** 2.46** 1.94**
(0.40) (0.55) (0.31)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * log(population density) -0.24* -0.01
(0.11) (0.07)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * log(population density) * (1998 - 2000) 0.54** 0.33*
(0.18) (0.13)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Share of urban population 0.05
(0.67)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Share of urban population * (1998 - 2000) 0.05
(1.01)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Education index -0.16
(0.28)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Education index * (1998 - 2000) -0.54
(0.37)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Household amenities index 0.39+
(0.22)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Household amenities index * (1998 - 2000) -0.06
(0.28)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Ethnic heterogeneity index -3.03
(2.17)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Ethnic heterogeneity index * (1998 - 2000) 2.49
(2.83)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Share of Akan -1.79+
(0.91)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Share of Akan * (1998 - 2000) 2.29*
(1.12)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Share of Ewe -0.17
(0.99)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Share of Ewe * (1998 - 2000) 0.50
(1.15)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Share of Ashanti 0.42
(0.86)
(Votes NPP - Votes NDC) * Share of Ashanti * (1998 - 2000) 0.30
(1.08)
Share of Ewe * region Ashanti 1.94
(1.23)
Share of Ewe * region Ashanti * (1998 - 2000) -3.01**
(1.14)
Share of Asante * region Ashanti 0.57
(0.58)
Share of Asante * region Ashanti * (1998 - 2000) 0.13
(0.51)
Observations 1449 1449 1449
R2 0.583 0.606 0.597
**, * and + mean respectively that the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Notes: OLS with standard errors given beneath the coeﬃcients. The standard errors are corrected for an arbitrary correlation between diﬀerent
observations for the same district. The public goods included in the speciﬁcation are: share of households connected to the electricity grid,
share of households with access to piped water, share of civil servants in the labor force, share of the rural population with access to a primary
school in the community, share of the rural population with access to a secondary school in the community, and share of the rural population
with access to a health clinic in the community. All the speciﬁcations include region-year ﬁxed eﬀects and type of public good-survey ﬁxed
eﬀects, and the same covariates as speciﬁcation 5 in Table 1, but all covariates are interacted with time in speciﬁcation 2.
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diﬀerent parts. Nevertheless, the signs of the coeﬃcients remain similar for each public
good.
7 Conclusion
This paper sets out to shed light on the mechanisms of political competition in semi-
democratic African countries. The Ghanaian democratization process presents an oppor-
tunity to analyze how the political economy aﬀects the allocation of public infrastructure
in Ghana.
Most empirical and theoretical papers posit that the government should either target
central districts in the electoral competition (swing districts) or its supporters. We
ﬁnd the opposite to be true in Ghana. When the NDC was in power from 1998 to
2000, the districts that voted for the opposition received more public goods. This was
particularly true when the districts had a leading opposition party politician. We assert
that this ﬁnding is partially driven by a sense of need to curry favor with opposition party
politicians.
These results were observed, at the end of the 1990s, in most particular circumstances.
Ghana was politically unstable from independence to the 1980s, when Jerry Rawlings took
over as dictator. By the end of the 1990s, Ghana was an emerging democracy with Jerry
Rawlings as the ﬁrst democratic president. A promising future paper could therefore be
to identify the emergence of these political mechanisms before 1992 when Ghana was a
dictatorship, and to check the persistence of these political patterns since 2004, following
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A Deﬁnition of the variables
Diﬀerence between shares of votes for the NPP and the NDC: Diﬀerence be-
tween the district's shares of votes for the NPP and the NDC at the last presidential
elections. It takes the value of the 1996 election for the 1998-2000 period, and the value
of the 2000 election for the 2000-2003 period.
Civil servants: Share of civil servants in the labour force.
District education: District average of an education variable for individuals aged 25
and over. This variable takes the value of 0 if the individual has never been to school (but
possibly pre-school), 1 if he started primary school, 2 if he completed primary school, 3 if
he went to lower secondary school, 4 if went to upper secondary school, and 5 if he went
to university.
Electricity supply: Share of households with access to electricity in the household.
Ethnic heterogeneity in the district: Sum of the squares of the shares of Akan,
Ewe, Ga-Adangbe and Others in the district. Included in the [0, 1] interval.
Health centres: Share of the rural population with access to a hospital, health clinic
or health centre. The 2000 facility census deﬁnes areas with a hospital, health clinic or
health centre less than 4 km away as having a health centre. The CWIQ 2003 survey
deﬁnes clusters in which more than 60% of households report access to a hospital or health
clinic less than 45 minutes away on foot as having a health centre.
Household amenities index: Synthetic variable measuring the comfort of the dwelling.
It is the sum of four variables, averaged at district level. The ﬁrst variable takes the value
of 1 if the cooking energy is charcoal, 2 if the cooking energy is electricity, gas or kerosene,
and 0 otherwise. The second variable takes the value of 1 if the roof is made of metal,
concrete or asbestos, and 0 otherwise. The third variable takes the value of 1 if the wall
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is in stabilised or made of burnt bricks, concrete or metal. The last variable takes the
value of 0 if the ﬂoor is made of earth, and 1 otherwise.
Log (population density): The population density is calculated from the 2000 census.
Northern regions: Dummy taking the value of 1 for the Northern, Upper West and
Upper East regions
NPP candidate, minister after 2000: This variable takes the value of 1 if one or
more 1996 NPP parliamentary election candidates in this district were minister(s) at some
point between 2000 and 2005. It takes the value of 0 otherwise. Taking the names of
each minister in Kufuor's government from 2001 to 2005, the 1996 parliamentary election
results provide information on whether they were candidates and, if so, in which district.
Of the 37 ministers, 15 were NPP candidates in the 1996 parliamentary election and 14
were elected. Eight of the corresponding 15 districts were urban (proportion of urban
population greater than 50%) and six of these were district capitals.
Public goods aggregate: All six types of public goods (civil servants, electricity sup-
ply, health centres, primary schools, secondary schools and water supply) are transformed
by linear transformation to have a mean of 0 and a standard error of 1, so as to ensure
comparability between public goods. The public goods aggregate is the sum of these six
variables.
Primary schools: Share of the rural population with access to a primary school. The
2000 facility census deﬁnes areas with a primary school less than 4 km away as having
a primary school. The CWIQ 2003 survey deﬁnes clusters in which more than 60% of
households report access to a primary school less than 45 minutes away on foot as having
a primary school.
Political index: Takes value 1 if one of the legislative candidates was minister after
2000 (under the NPP), -1 if one of the legislative candidates was minister before 2000
(under the NDC), and 0 if neither or both.
Secondary schools: Share of the rural population with access to a secondary school.
The 2000 facility census deﬁnes areas with a secondary school less than 4 km away as
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having a secondary school. The CWIQ 2003 survey deﬁnes clusters in which more than
60% of households report access to a secondary school less than 45 minutes away on foot
as having a secondary school.
Share of Akan in the district
Share of Ashanti in the district: This is calculated from the 2000 census.
Share of Ewe in the district
Share of urban population: This is calculated from the 2000 census. The deﬁnition
of an urban area in Ghana is one with a population of more than 5,000 inhabitants.
Water supply: Share of households with access to piped water in the district.
B Data sources


















6,003 6,009 39,584 6,251 379,372
# of clusters 400 300 3,267 412
C Water and electricy supply policies in Ghana
Water Supply
The Community Water and Sanitation Agency19 is made up of a head oﬃce and
ten regional oﬃces. It is the agency through which the majority of funds to the water
sector are channelled and co-ordinated (around 88% of total funds from 2001 to 2006). In
19However, there are other institutions working in the sector: Ghana Water Company Ltd (GWCL)
and the Water Resources Commission (WRC). [A Water Directorate has been set up in the Ministry of
Water Resources, Works and Housing to co-ordinate the activities of all sector institutions.]
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1994, Ghana launched the national Community Water and Sanitation Program (1994-1999
CWSP-1 and 1999-2004 CWSP-2) based on a demand- and community-driven approach.
The underlying principle is that a 5% community contribution normally has to be applied
to capital costs for water facilities for every investment in the water sector. However, the
World Bank (2008) reports that there are variations in the interpretation and application
of the policy.
Electricity Supply20
Two main operators generate electricity: the Electricity Company of Ghana and the
Volta River Authority (VRA) in charge of the hydroelectric plants in the Volta Basin.
The VRA is also mandated to distribute electricity in the North of Ghana. This led to
the creation of the Northern Electricity Department in 1987. By the end of 1997, two key
regulatory institutions had been created by acts of Parliament: the Public Utilities Regu-
latory Commission (PURC) and the Energy Commission (EC). The Ministry of Energy is
responsible for broad policy direction while the PURC is in charge of economic regulation,
fair competition among utilities and monitoring service quality. The EC is responsible
for national indicative planning, licensing electricity utilities and technical standards.
These two regulatory bodies were established to create the conditions required by the
World Bank to improve the electricity sector's operational eﬃciency, transparency and
independence from government. The two government-owned generation and distribution
utilities (ECG and VRA) have been granted signiﬁcant debt relief by both government
and international donors. Despite structural reforms and government and international
support, Ghana's electricity distribution sector is plagued with problems including poor
infrastructure, managerial failings that have led to high system losses, and severe liquidity
problems. Limitations on electricity services reportedly check economic growth and can
play a part in social unrest.
20All the information in this paragraph comes from RCEER (2005).
